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1 Introduction
Recent empirical research documents substantial diﬀerences in the patterns of ownership and
control of public companies around the world. While public ﬁrms in the Anglo-Saxon countries
have dispersed ownership with signiﬁcant managerial control, companies in the rest of the world
feature ownership and control concentrated normally in the hands of few large owners (Barca
and Becht (2001), Becht and Röell (1999), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)). A
number of studies argue that legal shareholder protection is one of the key determinants of the
ownership and control distribution (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), La Porta
et al (1998), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love (2004)).1
We present a model that provides an interesting prediction about the eﬀect of legal protection
of shareholders on outside ownership concentration in companies. Speciﬁcally, contrary to the
widespread view, we ﬁnd a non-monotonic relationship between legal protection and outside
ownership concentration. At the same time our model is consistent with the empirical evidence
on the link between the law and the total ownership concentration.
Empirical studies document a negative relationship between the strength of shareholder
protection and ownership concentration (see e.g. La Porta et al (1998), Himmelberg, Hubbard,
and Love (2004)). Now there also exist a number of theoretical models that rationalize this eﬀect,
e.g. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love (2004), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002). These models have
one large controlling shareholder - the insider - and they ﬁnd a negative relationship between
the quality of the law and the insider ownership. Therefore, strictly speaking, they study the
eﬀect of law on insider or managerial ownership, without allowing for a presence of a large
outside shareholder, whose interests could coincide with those of dispersed shareholders. If it
were true that all large shareholders (blockholders) and the managers of a company had the
same information and cooperatively participate in control, their coalition could be treated as
one insider. However, it does not seem to be always the case, as diﬀerent large owners and the
managers often have diﬀerent information and the level of involvement in the company aﬀairs,
and at times they conﬂict each other.
We draw a distinction between insiders and outsiders by the information parties have ex-
ante, i.e. prior to monitoring by a less informed party. To put it in an extreme way, an insider is
an ex-ante informed party, while an outsider is an ex-ante uninformed party. Of course, in case
when an ex-ante uninformed party successfully learns the information of an ex-ante informed
party, it essentially becomes an insider, but only ex-post.
Researchers have recognized both positive and negative sides of having outside blockholders
(see e.g. Becht, Bolton and Röell (2002), section 5.1). Their frequently emphasized role is
monitoring of insiders (managers hereafter). By monitoring and exercising their control outside
blockholders (blockholders hereafter) restrict managerial opportunism.2 However, there is a
1Surveys by La Porta et al (2000b) and Denis and McConnell (2003) summarize this strand of research.
2When a blockholder serves the interests of other outside shareholders, i.e. shareholder value maximization,
she can be considered as one more mechanism of corporate governance, in addition to managerial compensation
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danger that the blockholder, once informed, will use her information and control rights to
expropriate other shareholders.
These reasoning naturally leads to the question about the optimal ownership structure
of a company with an outside blockholder, in particular, how it should depend on the legal
environment. Given certain laws and enforcement practices an ownership allocation determines
both the incentives of the blockholder to monitor the manager and the incentives to expropriate
other shareholders. The optimal ownership structure should minimize the agency costs, deﬁned
as the combination of the ex-post costs of monitoring and expropriation and the ex-ante cost
of underinvestment (or underpricing) that reﬂects the fear of future expropriation. Changes in
the law change the incentives of the parties for a given ownership structure; consequently, the
optimal ownership structure is likely to diﬀer depending on the legal environment.
Our paper aims at analyzing this issue. We look at the problem of corporate governance as
a problem of the conﬂict of interest in the “triangle” of a manager, an outside blockholder and
a continuum of dispersed shareholders. The model combines an optimal monitoring analysis
a la Pagano and Röell (1998) with an analysis of the eﬀect of collusion between the informed
outside blockholder and the manager. We model legal shareholder protection through the cost
for the manager of deriving private beneﬁts at the expense of the shareholders. This cost is
a deadweight loss, reﬂecting the diﬃculty of expropriation under given quality of the law. An
increase in this cost is associated with strengthening shareholder protection.
A widespread view on outside blockholders as a mechanism of corporate governance is that
they are particularly important when legal shareholder protection is weak (Berglöf and Pajuste
(2003), Berglöf and von Thadden (2000), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). When legal protection
is good, outside blockholders are not needed because shareholders are already well protected
by the law, and, since blocks are costly due to the lack of diversiﬁcation or liquidity reasons,
the optimal ownership structure should be dispersed. On the contrary, when legal protection is
bad, a large outside shareholder is a very important (if not the only) instrument of restricting
managerial opportunism.
This reasoning might lead one to the conclusion that the law and outside ownership concen-
tration are substitutes. Looking at this issue in a ﬁner way we argue that it does not have to
be necessarily true. When legal protection is very strong, an outside blockholder is not needed
indeed, because an equity compensation scheme is enough to discipline the manager. Our focus,
however, is on the regimes with not so good legal protection, where blockholder monitoring is
crucial to ensure ﬁrm ﬁnancing. We show that in these regimes the size of the block depends
non-monotonically on the quality of the law. Taking into account interdependence between
the law and both the monitoring and the collusion incentive of the blockholder we obtain that
under very bad legal protection the blockholder’s share goes down as the law improves, but after
certain quality of the law it starts increasing until the law becomes so good that a blockholder
schemes, a board of directors, the market for corporate control, etc. For a recent review of the corporate
governance mechanisms see Becht, Bolton and Röell (2002).
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is not needed anymore.
Our story goes as follows. The manager, who has no money, is trying to raise external funds
from outside investors in exchange for future security beneﬁts. However, after the injection
of funds has been made he has an incentive to derive private beneﬁts instead of maximizing
shareholder value. This creates the classical agency problem as in Jensen and Meckling (1976).
In order to get ﬁnanced the manager attempts to reduce the agency problem by exposing himself
to monitoring by a blockholder. However, there is a possibility that the informed blockholder
can collude with the manager at the expense of the dispersed shareholders — the anticipation of
such collusion reduces the dispersed shareholders’ willingness to provide funds.
The manager eventually bears both the cost of monitoring and the cost of private bene-
ﬁt extraction. Hence, his aim is to choose the ownership structure that would minimize the
combination of these costs subject to the investors’ participation constraint. While doing that
the manager is concerned with two things. First, by setting the right blockholder’s share he
wants to induce the optimal level of monitoring, i.e. the one that achieves the optimal balance
between costly monitoring, which ensures certain positive shareholder value, and the ineﬃcient
private beneﬁt extraction. Second, he wants to credibly commit to avoid collusion by choosing
the sum of his own share and the blockholder’s share large enough such that the two parties
jointly prefer proﬁt maximization. These two goals, however, may be in conﬂict. In our model
they are not when shareholder protection is relatively good and they are when it is bad.
When legal protection is relatively good (the cost of the private beneﬁt extraction is relatively
high) there exists an ownership structure that both produces the optimal monitoring and is
collusion proof. Like in Pagano and Röell (1998), the manager optimally trades oﬀ ineﬃciency
of expropriation against the monitoring cost. When the law becomes worse private beneﬁts
become more valuable for the manager. Hence, it becomes optimal to reduce monitoring in
order to increase expected private beneﬁt extraction. As a result, the optimal outside block
decreases as the law deteriorates.
When legal protection becomes suﬃciently bad, i.e. private beneﬁts become suﬃciently
valuable, collusion with the manager becomes very attractive for the blockholder and its threat
starts driving the result. The blockholder’s share that would induce optimal monitoring under
no threat of collusion violates the collusion proofness constraint. Therefore, a larger share has to
be allocated to the blockholder in order to kill the incentive to collude, which comes at the cost
of excessive monitoring. As legal protection worsens further, collusion becomes more diﬃcult
to avoid and the blockholder’s share has to be increased in order to preserve the “no collusion”
incentive.
Overall, we obtain a U-shape dependence of the outside blockholder’s share on the quality
of the law as measured by the cost of private beneﬁt extraction. The fact that the outside
blockholder’s share is non-monotonic in the quality of the law does not imply that the same
is true for the aggregate ownership concentration. Our model is consistent with an inverse
relationship between the aggregate ownership concentration and shareholder protection found
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empirically by La Porta et al (1998) and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love (2004) and modelled
theoretically by Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love (2004) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002).
Our model is closely related to two recent papers: Burkart and Panunzi (2006) and Burkart,
Panunzi and Shleifer (2003). Like us, these papers incorporate both the eﬀect of blockholder
monitoring and the eﬀect of collusion between the blockholder and the manager. Burkart,
Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) obtain a negative dependence of the outside blockholder’s share on
the strength of shareholder protection.3 Burkart and Panunzi (2006), however, show that this
link can be both positive and negative, depending on the character of interdependence between
the law and monitoring.
While the ﬁnding of Burkart and Panunzi (2006) parallels ours in that strengthening legal
protection does not necessarily lead to lower outside ownership concentration, there are impor-
tant diﬀerences between the two papers. In particular, collusion does not qualitatively change
the eﬀect of the law in Burkart and Panunzi (2006)4, while in our paper it does. Moreover, in
Burkart and Panunzi (2006), while the blockholder’s share may or may not go up, monitoring
always goes up as legal protection weakens. In our paper, on the contrary, monitoring may
decrease when legal protection becomes weaker.
Importantly, our paper and Burkart and Panunzi (2006) have rather diﬀerent setups and
mechanisms that determine the link between the law and the ownership structure. This fact
reinforces the validity of both papers’ claim that outside ownership concentration is not neces-
sarily a substitute for legal protection.
In section 5 we will discuss the diﬀerences between our paper and both Burkart and Panunzi
(2006) and Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) in detail. In short, we think that our analysis is
concerned with a diﬀerent type of ﬁrms. In the two mentioned paper the initial owner maximizes
her own welfare subject to either the manager’s participation constraint (Burkart, Panunzi and
Shleifer (2003)) or the manager’s initiative constraint (Burkart and Panunzi (2006)). The
interaction between the law, monitoring and these constraints determines the eﬀects of legal
protection. Therefore, we think that their setups better ﬁt large, initially close ﬁrms, in no
need for new investment, the owners of which want to hire a professional manager and sell a
fraction of equity to dispersed shareholders in order to commit not to monitor the manager too
much. When legal protection raises the blockholder’s monitoring incentive, her share has to be
decreased in order to ensure either managerial participation or initiative.5 However, when better
legal protection makes monitoring less attractive for the blockholder, her share may have to be
increased in order to restore necessary monitoring incentives (Burkart and Panunzi (2006)).
Our analysis is rather about entrepreneurial ﬁrms in which there is no question of hiring a
3The paper also looks at the decision of a company founder to delegate the management to a professional
manager. The authors show that at suﬃciently low levels of legal protection the founder prefers to manage the
ﬁrm himself.
4Collusion does not qualitatively change the eﬀect of legal protection in Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003)
either.
5The interaction between blockholder monitoring and managerial initiative was ﬁrst examined in Burkart,
Gromb and Panunzi (1997). Too much monitoring reduces the initiative. Because the initiative is valuable for
shareholders, a blockholder’s share must not be too large in order to credibly avoid overmonitoring.
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manager, but which instead seek external ﬁnance to realize their investment opportunities, and
there is no question of either managerial participation or initiative.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. In section 3 we solve the
model. Section 4 analyses the eﬀects of legal protection on the ownership structure. In section
5 we discuss the results and compare them with those of the related papers. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 The model
All the agents are risk-neutral in the model. There is an entrepreneur (whom we will call the
manager) who has necessary managerial skills and information about available projects but
does not have funds. Performing any of the projects requires the investment outlay I which the
manager has to raise from outside investors.6
We assume that due to high competition between potential investors the manager has full
bargaining power at the ﬁnancing stage, i.e. he will maximize his payoﬀ subject to the investors’
participation constraint. We assume also that all funds are raised by selling equity. The manager
retains fraction αm of the shares for himself, sells part αb of the shares as a block to a large
shareholder (the blockholder), and the remaining part αd as dispersed equity. The funds can be
used by the manager both for creating veriﬁable proﬁt and for deriving a non-veriﬁable private
beneﬁt. Lack of commitment to abstain from the private beneﬁt extraction will reduce the
shareholders’ willingness to provide ﬁnance in the ﬁrst place. However, the shareholders can
limit managerial opportunism through monitoring. The role of the blockholder will be to solve a
collective action problem in monitoring. The blockholder, however, may sometimes be tempted
to collude with the manager for sharing the private beneﬁt instead of pursuing shareholder
interests. The following subsection sets up the game formally.
2.1 The game
The game is illustrated in Figure 1. The sequence of the events is as follows:
Time 0. The manager decides on the ownership structure of the ﬁrm (αd, αb) and share
αm of the cash ﬂow rights he retains. The manager also sets the prices of the block and the
dispersed equity subject to the investors’ participation constraint. The investors (both the
dispersed shareholders and the blockholder) decide whether to provide funds.
We assume that investing more than I in the ﬁrm is unproductive. However, in principle,
the manager can raise more than I in exchange for more equity and simply pocket the excess
funds. Such possibility does not qualitatively aﬀect our analysis — as we will see it will just
6Alternatively we could assume that the manager initially is a sole owner of a ﬁrm which runs with zero
proﬁt. He receives zero private beneﬁts and has no cash. He can raise outside funds for restructuring which
would increase the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability.
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give the manager greater freedom in choosing αd, which would be potentially beneﬁcial, had we
introduced any cost of large shareholdings.
Time 1. The raised funds, I, can be used for either of the two purposes: creating a veriﬁable
proﬁt, which is distributed among the shareholders proportionally to their shares, or deriving
a non-veriﬁable private beneﬁt (self-dealing). For simplicity, we assume that the manager has
a choice between two options only: either he derives B (for simplicity non-random) and then
the proﬁt is zero with probability one, or he maximizes the proﬁt, in which case the proﬁt is
R with probability (1 − q) and 0 with probability q. Let us denote the expected proﬁt in this
case, (1− q)R, by Π.7
We assume that q > 0. Thus, zero proﬁt cannot be a proof of managerial self-dealing.
Moreover, a binary distribution of the proﬁt with zero being one of the two possible realizations
implies that an equity contract is optimal in our model (though it is indistinguishable from a
debt contract with limited liability). Since it is only the expected proﬁt that will matter in our
model, we we will conduct our analysis in terms of Π.
The blockholder can monitor the manager’s actions. Monitoring means the following. The
blockholder chooses how much to invest in monitoring — the monitoring cost c, which is born
solely by the her. With probability p(c) she becomes “informed”. Being informed means that in
case the manager chooses the private beneﬁt extraction, the blockholder identiﬁes the ways of
the managerial self-dealing and can force the manager to maximize proﬁts instead. In case the
manager has chosen proﬁt maximization, the blockholder realizes that no self-dealing is taking
place. With probability 1 − p(c) the blockholder stays uninformed — even if the manager is
self-dealing and the blockholder rationally expects that, she does not see how this self-dealing
is taking place. We assume that in this case she is unable to stop self-dealing.
Function p(·) is deﬁned on [0,∞), everywhere increasing and strictly concave, p(0) =
0, p(∞) = 1, p′(0) = ∞, p′(∞) = 0. We assume that the dispersed shareholders cannot
coordinate for monitoring, and since each of them is of measure zero no one of them will moni-
tor.8
Time 2. A number of situations are possible.
If the blockholder is uninformed the ﬁrm goes on operating according to the manager’s
choice. In this case, if the manager has chosen self-dealing he obtains M = B and the share-
holders get a gross (without taking into account the monitoring cost and the investment) return
of zero.
If the blockholder is informed and the manager has chosen to maximize proﬁts, the ﬁrm
goes on operating according to the manager’s choice. Everybody receives his share of the ﬁnal
7Such simple choice structure facilitates the exposition. A more general model, in which the manager is allowed
to choose any convex combination of the pure proﬁt maximization and pure self-dealing, i.e. any x ∈ [0, 1] such
that the expected proﬁt is xΠ and the private beneﬁt is (1−x)B, delivers exactly the same results as our simpliﬁed
model.
8 If we had introduced a small ﬁxed cost of monitoring, then “no monitoring” would be a dominant strategy
for each of the dispersed shareholders.
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proﬁt, i.e. αiΠ in expected terms.
If the blockholder is informed and the manager has chosen the private beneﬁt extraction,
the blockholder has two options:
1. She can force the manager to switch to proﬁt maximization.9 Then the payoﬀs are exactly
as if the manager had chosen to maximize proﬁts from t = 2, i.e. the private beneﬁt is 0 and
the ﬁnal proﬁt is distributed among all the parties, including the manager, proportionally to
their shares.
2. She can collude with the manager for sharing the private beneﬁt B. The outside option
in bargaining is proﬁt maximization. The surplus from the collusion is Σ ≡ B − (1 − αd)Π.
In this case, the manager’s and the blockholder’s payoﬀs are respectively Mc = αmΠ + µΣ
and Sbc = αbΠ+ (1− µ)Σ, where subscript c stands for “collusion”. The managerial share µ of
the surplus is determined by the bargaining powers of the parties and is exogenous.
In case there is no ﬁnancing at t = 0, all the parties get a zero payoﬀ.
 M + Sb = B 
Sd = 0 
 
p(c) 
Blockholder is informed t = 2 t = 1 
- Manager chooses 
the ownership 
structure (αb, αd) 
and the prices 
 
- Investors decide 
whether to buy the 
shares 
 
 
- Manager 
chooses between 
profit maximization 
and private benefit 
extraction 
- Blockholder 
chooses monitoring 
effort c 
t = 0 
Collusion 
Profit 
maximization 
1 – p(c) 
Blockholder is 
uninformed M = B 
Si = 0 
 
M = αmΠ 
Si = αiΠ 
 
Figure 1: The game.
Before discussing the legal system we make the following crucial assumption:
Assumption 1. B < Π.
This assumptions says that the private beneﬁt extraction is ineﬃcient. The cost for the
manager of extracting the private beneﬁt is a deadweight loss and is 1 − B/Π. Assumption 1
implies that the ﬁrst-best solution is to invest I only in creating the expected proﬁt Π.
9For example, she can call a shareholder meeting, disclose her information there and put the change in the
ﬁrm’s strategy to the vote.
8
2.2 Legal protection
We assume that legal shareholder protection determines the value of B. Lower B means a higher
cost 1−B/Π of the private beneﬁt extraction (and a higher deadweight loss associated with it).
We associate lower B with better legal protection. The magnitude of B reﬂects the restraints
that both the contents of the law and its enforcement put on expropriating shareholders. Better
law makes ﬁnding self-dealing opportunities more diﬃcult and forces a manager to search for
complicated, and thus costly, ways of expropriation (e.g. via establishing complex and non-
transparent control structures with intermediary companies). Stronger legal protection also
imposes higher expected penalties on wrongdoers (e.g. because of a higher probability of being
caught and found guilty).
While it is common to assume that the law determines the cost function of private beneﬁt
extraction (La Porta et al (2002), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and
Love (2004), Burkart and Panunzi (2006), Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003)) it is not ob-
vious what the exact relationship between the law and the cost function should be. The only
feature that seems unquestionable is that better law should increase (at least weakly) the cost
of expropriating shareholders of a share of the security beneﬁts for any such share. Our model
obviously satisﬁes this requirement.
Since the manager’s choice consists of only two options, our model produces exactly the same
outcomes as if the cost of self-dealing were a linear function of the proﬁt diverted (that would
lead to a “bang-bang” solution, which our model yields by construction). The law increases the
slope of this function. La Porta et al (2002), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) and Himmelberg,
Hubbard, and Love (2004) share the latter feature as well. However, in those papers the cost is
a convex function, which results in an interior solution for expropriation. We will brieﬂy discuss
the robustness of our results with respect to the form of the cost function at the end of section
4.
In Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) and for the most part of Burkart and Panunzi (2006)
expropriation does not involve ex-post ineﬃciency, i.e. there is no ex-post cost of transferring
wealth from the shareholders to the manager, and legal protection just sets an upper bound on
the amount of the proﬁt that can be diverted. This implies that, regardless of the joint equity
share of the controlling parties, they would always want to divert the maximum amount of the
proﬁt, allowed by the law, unless it is exogenously assumed that the blockholder pursues the
small shareholders’ interests and cannot (or does not want to) collude with the manager.10
In our model, the choice between expropriation and proﬁt maximization depends on the
equity share of the controlling parties, which is more realistic. Both better legal protection
10The authors consider two scenarios: one in which the blockholder’s interests are assumed to be perfectly
aligned with those of small shareholders (e.g. because private beneﬁts are not transferable), and one in which
there is no assumption of alignment. In the latter case, due to the ex-post eﬃciency of expropriation, the
blockholder will always collude with the manager and they will divert the maximum possible amount of the
proﬁt.
In Section 5.2 of Burkart and Panunzi (2006) the authors allow for partial alignment by introducing a convex
cost of expropriation. In that case an interior solution for expropriation is possible.
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and a higher equity share of the manager-blockholder coalition increase the chance of the “no
expropriation” outcome.
The aim of our analysis is to examine how the legal parameter B aﬀects the choice of the
ownership structure (αd, αb). Before proceeding with the solution we are going to make an
assumption that ensures the need for blockholder monitoring.
2.3 Legal protection and the need for a blockholder
It is easy to see that when legal protection is suﬃciently strong, speciﬁcally when B < Π− I,
the ﬁrst-best (proﬁt maximization) can be guaranteed by the manager simply via keeping a
suﬃciently large equity share. Speciﬁcally, any αm that satisﬁes B/Π < αm < (Π − I)/Π
makes the manager better oﬀ from maximizing proﬁts than from self-dealing at t = 1 (because
αmΠ > B) and satisﬁes the investors’ participation constraint (1 − αm)Π > I. Thus, indeed,
in line with the widespread view, when the law protects shareholders well enough, blockholder
monitoring is not needed and the manager can be disciplined through an equity compensation
scheme.
Our focus, however, is on the situations when a blockholder is needed, i.e. when legal
protection is not good enough. Therefore, we make the following crucial assumption:
Assumption 2. B > Π− I.
This assumption says that legal protection is not strong enough for the parties to write a
contract on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt that would prevent expropriation and satisfy the investors’ partici-
pation constraint at the same time. In other words, Assumption 2 says that the agency problem
is serious enough that the managerial equity share he needs to keep in order to credibly commit
not to expropriate the shareholders is too large to raise the required funds. That is, under
Assumption 2 the ﬁrst-best is not achievable. In the terminology of Tirole (2001) it is called the
“dearth of pledgeable income” problem. The manager prefers to self-deal for any αm that would
be consistent with the investors’ participation constraint under no possibility of expropriation.
Although Assumption 2 rules out the alignment of the manager’s and the shareholders’
interests, it does not rule out the alignment of the interests of the manager-blockholder coalition
with those of the dispersed shareholders — for a given quality of the law there is a threshold share
of the manager-blockholder coalition, above which the parties jointly prefer proﬁt maximization.
Thus, as we will see, the presence of the blockholder who monitors the manager and abstains
from collusion with him is crucial for restricting managerial opportunism and ensuring ﬁnancing
by the dispersed shareholders.
Throughout our subsequent analysis, when we will speak about B, we will use terms “good”
and “bad” legal shareholder protection (or law), having in mind that we are in the world
restricted by Assumption 2. That is, the values of B that correspond to “good” legal protection
will be the ones that are not much above Π− I. In other words, the law can be “good” in our
model but not “too good”.
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3 Solution
We are looking for a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, determined by:
- the pair (αd, αb),
- the decisions of the dispersed shareholders and the blockholder whether to provide funds
or not,
- the manager’s choice between self-dealing and maximizing proﬁts,
- the choice of c by the blockholder,
- if the manager has not followed the proﬁt maximizing strategy and the blockholder is
informed, the decision of the manager and the blockholder whether to collude or not.
There will be three relevant constraints in the analysis: collusion proofness, optimal moni-
toring and participation constraints. We will derive them now when solving the game. It will
turn out that there is never collusion in equilibrium and the blockholder’s share is such that
the optimal balance between the ineﬃcient private beneﬁt extraction and costly monitoring is
achieved, given the collusion proofness constraint.
3.1 Formal solution
First of all, notice that self-dealing is a strictly dominant strategy for the manager. It can be seen
from the following reasoning. The necessary condition for ﬁnancing requires that (1−αm)Π ≥ I,
otherwise the investors would never provide funds. This condition, combined with Assumption
2, implies that αmΠ < B. It means that when the blockholder is uninformed, the manager
is better oﬀ deriving B than maximizing the proﬁt. If the blockholder becomes informed,
either proﬁt maximization or collusion follows at t = 2. If there is proﬁt maximization, then
the manager has not lost anything from having chosen to self-deal. If there is collusion, the
manager gets Mc = αmΠ+ µΣ > αmΠ.
Now the analysis is simpliﬁed and we can start solving the game by backward induction.
At t = 2 the manager and the blockholder abstain from collusion whenever they jointly gain
more from the proﬁt maximization than from deriving private beneﬁts. We call it the collusion
proofness constraint :
(1− αd)Π ≥ B
or
αd ≤ 1−B/Π (CP)
Assume that at time t = 2 collusion is not optimal for the coalition of the manager and
the informed blockholder, that is (CP) holds. At time t = 1 the blockholder chooses how
much to invest in monitoring. She maximizes her expected utility net of the monitoring cost
Sb − c = p(c)αbΠ − c. Due to our assumptions about p(c) the solution is always interior, the
11
ﬁrst order condition yields the blockholder’s choice of c, which we denote c∗(αb):
p′(c∗) =
1
αbΠ
(M)
We call this constraint the monitoring constraint. It is easy to see that since p′′(·) < 0, c∗ is
increasing in αb. This result is very natural and common for papers that examine blockholder
monitoring — the higher the blockholder’s stake the more she is concerned with the equity value
and the more she monitors.
Hence, provided that (CP) holds, the participation constraint (P) of the investors is:
p(c∗(αb))(αb + αd)Π ≥ c
∗(αb) + I
or
αb + αd ≥
c∗(αb) + I
Πp(c∗(αb))
(P)
To sum up, if after period t = 0 the values of αd andαb are such that constraints (P) and
(CP) hold then in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the subgame that starts at t = 1:
- the manager tries to self-deal,
- the blockholder monitors with intensity c∗(αb),
- if the blockholder gets informed there is no collusion and the ﬁrm’s strategy is changed to
the proﬁt maximization.
Will the manager at t = 0 want to choose an ownership structure that guarantees the absence
of collusion, i.e. such that (CP) holds? The answer is “yes”.
Lemma 1 Collusion never happens in equilibrium of the entire game.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind this lemma is rather simple. Since the manager always extracts all the
expected surplus from the relationships with the investors, and extracting the private beneﬁt
is ineﬃcient, he prefers to establish a commitment that would assure that all the investors get
their money back and collusion does not happen.
Thus, if it is feasible to satisfy jointly constraints (CP), (P) and αb + αd ≤ 1, then indeed
in equilibrium the manager will do so. Otherwise no ﬁnancing takes place at t = 0. The
necessary and suﬃcient condition for such ownership structure to exist is that the ownership
structure with αb = 1 satisﬁes (P). Such allocation of ownership obviously ensures the absence
of collusion. At the same time it induces monitoring that maximizes the net investors’ payoﬀ —
when all the equity belongs to one shareholder, she will maximize the shareholder value net of
the monitoring cost. Thus, if αb = 1 does not satisfy (P), no other ownership structure does.
Hence, we make the following assumption:
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Assumption 3. Πp(c∗(1))− c∗(1)− I ≥ 0
The manager can always choose αd such that (P) becomes binding. Since the utilities of
the parties are transferable, it means that when choosing the ownership structure the manager
maximizes the aggregate welfare subject to (P), (M), (CP) and αb + αd ≤ 1:
max
αb,αd
{V (αb) = p(c
∗(αb))Π + [1− p(c
∗(αb))]B − c
∗(αb)− I}
s.t.:
αb + αd ≤ 1 (feasibility constraint)
αb + αd =
c∗(αb) + I
Πp(c∗(αb))
(P)
c∗(αb) is determined by p
′(c∗) =
1
αbΠ
(M)
αd ≤ 1−
B
Π
(CP)
Assume that the unconstrained maximization of V (αb) results in some αb = αb. Then,
if there can be found αd, such that (αd, αb) satisﬁes all the constraints, the unconstrained
maximization of V (αb) solves the original problem with respect to αb. Assume that such αd
can be found. Since V (αb) depends only on c
∗(αb) we can maximize V with respect to c
∗ and
then derive what the optimal αb is. The ﬁrst order condition yields:
p′(c∗) =
1
Π−B
(1)
This is the condition for the optimal monitoring. The optimal block αb is the one that
equalizes the blockholder’s choice of monitoring with the optimal monitoring, i.e. using (M) we
can write:
1
αbΠ
=
1
Π−B
, i.e. αb = 1−
B
Π
(OM)
We will call it the optimal monitoring condition.
Remember, that this solution is valid only if we can ﬁnd αd ≤ 1− αb, such that (CP) and
(P) are satisﬁed. If such αd does not exist, αb will be inevitably larger than αb and there will
be too much monitoring with respect to the optimal level, determined by (2). In this case the
solution will be at the intersection of (CP) and (P) because such ownership structure produces
monitoring as close to the optimal level as possible, given (CP), i.e. αb will be determined by
αb + 1−
B
Π
=
c∗(αb) + I
Πp(c∗(αb))
. Let us denote this value by αcb, where c indicates that the collusion
proofness constraint is binding.
Thus, the equilibrium is:
At t = 0 the manager chooses α∗b = min{1−
B
Π
, αcb}, α
∗
d ∈ [
c∗(α∗b) + I
Πp(c∗(α∗b))
− α∗b , 1−
B
Π
]. The
investors provide at least I.
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At t = 1 the manager tries to self-deal, the blockholder monitors with intensity c∗(αb),
At t = 2 if the blockholder gets informed there is no collusion and the ﬁrm’s strategy is
changed to the proﬁt maximization. Otherwise the private beneﬁt extraction occurs.
Notice that whenever α∗b = αb the ownership structure is not uniquely determined with
respect to αd (except when αb = α
c
b). The reason is that the manager is only concerned with
setting the blockholder’s share optimally. Once it is set, the dispersed equity share can be
varied (as we mentioned at the beginning, the manager can raise more than I in exchange for
more equity and simply pocket the excess funds). Neither the shareholders’ nor the manager’s
expected welfare changes, only the composition of the manager’s share and the dispersed equity
share changes. If there were some beneﬁts from having more dispersed equity, e.g. because
of liquidity or risk aversion considerations, the solution would likely be unique and somewhere
close to
c∗(α∗b) + I
Πp(c∗(α∗b))
−α∗b , because the manager would want to sell as much equity as possible do
dispersed shareholders. However, formally, our model does not allow to make such a reﬁnement.
Even though we have not explicitly introduced the prices of shares, it is easy to see that the
block is priced at a discount, because the blockholder has to be compensated for his monitoring
eﬀort. At ﬁrst sight it seems at odds with the widespread evidence that blocks are traded at a
premium. However, Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2001) document that private placements
of blocks, which is exactly our case, are priced at a discount, in contrast to block trades.11
3.2 Graphical interpretation
A graphical interpretation of the problem is a convenient way to understand the solution.
Figure 2 depicts all the constraints in space (αd, αb). Lines (P) and (CP) are the corresponding
constraints taken as equalities. The collusion proofness constraint (CP) is just a vertical line at
αd = 1−B/Π, and the optimal monitoring line, (OM), is a horizontal line at αb = 1−B/Π. The
most diﬃcult thing is to understand how (P) looks like. Lemma 2 establishes the properties of
(P) that are relevant for our analysis.
Lemma 2 Given Assumption 3, the constraint (P) in space
(αd, αb) has the following properties:
- it is downward sloping,
- αb = 0 when αd =∞,
- it intersects the line αb+αd = 1, and there is only one intersection point in the north-eastern
quadrant (i.e. satisfying αd ≥ 0, αb ≥ 0)
Proof. See the appendix.
Though in Figure 2 constraint (P) is depicted convex, it is ambiguous whether it is necessarily
convex for the general form of p(·). However, for our purposes we do need to know that.
11 It is fare to say that they do ﬁnd evidence that the discount is a compensation for monitoring. Instead, the
authors argue, it is a compensation for helping the manager to entrench himself.
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So, the set of the ownership structures that allows to attract ﬁnance without collusion is
bounded by (P), (CP) and αb + αd = 1. If (CP) is far enough on the right, optimality further
requires to set αb = αb, hence it reduces this set to the set of the optimal allocations, which is
segment CD. If (CP) is too much on the left (dashed line), the solution is unique — it is point
B, at which α∗b = α
c
b and α
∗
d = 1−B/Π.
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αb 
αd 1-B/Π 1 
αb = 1-B/Π 
(CP)
 
(P)
 
(OM)
 
αd + αb = 1 
(CP)
 
αb
c 
Figure 2: Graphical solution.
4 The eﬀects of legal protection
Now we are ready to examine how the parameter of the law B aﬀects the choice of the ownership
structure by the manager. Look at Figure 3. When B is low enough (CP) is rather far on the
right, while (OM) is rather high. So, we are in the situation when point D is above point B. In
this case, the goal of achieving the optimal monitoring does not conﬂict with the goal of avoiding
collusion, because the manager can choose the optimal outside block size αb and then simply
keep his share large enough to ensure no collusion. Hence, the collusion proofness constraint
(CP) is not binding. The solution is segment CD, a bold line in Figure 3. The equilibrium
blockholder’s share α∗b is the one that induces optimal monitoring: α
∗
b = αb.
As B goes up (OM) moves down and (CP) moves to the left. Hence, αb goes down, i.e.
the optimal outside block decreases when the cost of the private beneﬁt extraction falls. The
segment CD shrinks, we denote the new segment by C’D’.
Since higher B means weaker shareholder protection in our model, this result is contrary
to the widely-held view that weaker legal protection should be associated with higher outside
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ownership concentration. However, it parallels the one in Pagano in Röell (1998), who argued
that a lower dead-weigh cost of the private beneﬁt extraction should be associated with a lower
optimal outside blockholder’s share.
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Figure 3: Eﬀects of an increase in B when B is low.
At some value of B points B’, D’ and C’ coincide, we will denote this value by B̂. For
B = B̂ there is a unique equilibrium ownership structure, this is the highest value of B when
(CP) constraint is not yet binding for the choice of αb. The corresponding αb is denoted by
α∗bmin.
For B > B̂ the necessity to avoid collusion drives the choice of the ownership structure.
Look at Figure 4 now. As B goes up further the manager cannot anymore choose αb as the
solution, because that would lead to collusion for any αd that satisﬁes (P). The manager still
wants to ensure the monitoring intensity as close to the optimal one as possible. Therefore, he
chooses the blockholder’s share as small as possible, which corresponds to the intersection of
(P) and (CP). In Figure 4 the solution is at point B” and this point goes up along constraint
(P) as B rises further. The outside block gets larger and the dispersed equity share becomes
smaller.
In fact, in our model, if the blockholder becomes informed he can be treated as an insider
ex-post. The collusion proofness constraint then can be viewed as the constraint on the insider
ownership that requires the alignment of the insiders’ and outsiders’ interests. Under a good
law the alignment is achieved even for a small joint insiders’ share and is not a concern — the
only concern is the optimal monitoring. Under a bad law the alignment consideration becomes
16
the driving force — the insider ownership has to increase with a decrease in the quality of the
law in order to keep the alignment. This reasoning parallels the one in Shleifer and Wolfenzon
(2002) who argue that a lower quality of legal protection requires higher insider ownership to
credibly abstain from expropriation.
One may still wonder why the blockholder’s share has to be increased when the joint share
goes up. Why not keep it optimal and just increase the manager’s share to preserve the align-
ment? The answer is simple — the participation constraint must hold. If only the manager’s
share is increased then the investors will not break even.
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Figure 4: Eﬀects of an increase in B when B is high
So, we obtain a U-shape dependence of the outside ownership concentration on B with
the minimum value α∗bmin which is reached at B̂. Or, in other words, we obtain a U-shape
dependence of the outside ownership concentration on the quality of shareholder protection.
The result is illustrated by Figure 5.
The above analysis can be summarized in a proposition.
Proposition 1 Legal protection of shareholders has a non-monotonic eﬀect on the optimal
blockholder’s share. When legal protection is weak (i.e. the cost of the private beneﬁt extraction
is low), the optimal blockholder’s share is decreasing in the quality of legal protection; while
when legal protection is strong (i.e. the cost of the private beneﬁt extraction is high), the optimal
blockholder’s share is increasing in the quality of legal protection.
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Figure 5: Legal protection and the size of the outside block.
To conclude our analysis let us also state the result about the eﬀect of law on the dispersed
equity share that follows from our analysis. In ﬁgure 4 the ownership structure is determined
uniquely and it is clear from the picture that an improvement in legal protection (a decrease
in B) leads to an increase in the dispersed equity share. However, in ﬁgure 3 the equilibrium
dispersed equity share is not unique, and strengthening legal protection gives the manager
a wider choice of the dispersed equity share (e.g. consider a move from C’D’ to CD) and
increases the upper bound for the dispersed equity (point D instead of D’). Introducing even
slight beneﬁts from having more dispersed equity (which we have mentioned earlier) would
eliminate the indeterminacy in the solution and a decrease in B would unambiguously lead to
more dispersed ﬁnancing. Hence, our proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Improvements in legal protection (a decrease in the cost of the private beneﬁt
extraction) unambiguously raise the dispersed equity share when legal protection is weak, and
raise the upper bound for the dispersed equity share (i.e. decrease the lower bound for the total
ownership concentration) when legal protection is strong.
This result is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings by La Porta et al (1998) and the theo-
retical work by Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) that ﬁrms in countries with weaker shareholder
protection have smaller stock markets and higher ownership concentration.
It is fare to say that the result of Proposition 1 may not be robust to the choice of the self-
dealing technology (i.e. the form of the cost-of-expropriation function). While for Proposition
1 to hold the cost of self-dealing does not have to be linear (as essentially is in our setup)
and can be convex, some constraints on its form are anyway necessary. Without formalizing
them, we can say that the critical condition for our non-monotonicity result is that for a given
manager’s share his incentives are not too sensitive to changes in the law within the bounds
set by Assumption 2. In this case, strengthening legal protection does not lead to a suﬃcient
reduction in the expropriation, but still increases its deadweight loss for a given amount of the
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private beneﬁt. Hence, the overall result is a raise in the deadweight loss. This eﬀect needs
to be oﬀset by an increase in monitoring, which is provided through raising the blockholder’s
share. In such a case, our Proposition 1 is valid.
5 Discussion of the results
One way to view our results is through the trade-oﬀ between the ex-ante optimality for the
initial owner (the manager) and the ex-post optimality for the participants of the game (the
blockholder and the manager). Ex-ante the manager is concerned with two things. First, he
wants to credibly induce the optimal level of monitoring, i.e. the one that achieves the optimal
balance between costly monitoring, that ensures certain positive shareholder value, and the
ineﬃcient private beneﬁt extraction. Second, he wants to credibly commit to refrain from
collusion. On top of that the manager needs to satisfy the investor’s participation constraint,
i.e. he cannot retain a too large share of equity. Ex-post, however, the monitoring intensity is
determined by the blockholder’s share and the decision whether to collude or not is determined
by the joint share of the manager and the blockholder.
The right ownership structure is to induce the ex-ante optimal decisions ex-post. The prob-
lem is, however, that it is not always possible. Speciﬁcally, it is possible when legal protection
is good and it is not when legal protection is bad. This is the source of a U-shape link between
legal protection and the optimal blockholder’s share.
When the law is good, collusion can be avoided even through relatively small ownership
concentration. Hence, there exists the ownership structure such that the optimal monitoring is
induced, collusion does not happen and the outside shareholders’ equity share is large enough
to satisfy their participation constraint. The ex-ante optimality requires to increase managerial
opportunism when the law worsens (but not too much) and expropriation becomes more valuable
(similarly to Pagano and Röell (1998)). The fact that collusion is unattractive for a wide range
of ownership structures provides the manager with enough freedom to adjust the outside block
optimally to changes in the law.
When the law becomes too bad, the ex-ante optimal behavior cannot be ensured by the
choice of the ownership structure, because of the conﬂict between the provision of the optimal
monitoring incentive and the incentive not to collude. This conﬂict arises because collusion
becomes too attractive ex-post. To credibly avoid it the total ownership concentration (the joint
share of the manager and the blockholder) has to be large enough. The investors’ participation
constraint restrains the manager from achieving this task by simply choosing his own share
large enough and setting the outside block size optimally. As a result, the outside block is
inevitably too large to produce the ex-ante optimal monitoring. To put it another way, in order
to attract ﬁnance the optimal monitoring has to be sacriﬁced for the commitment not to collude.
As legal protection worsens further, the size of the “collusion pie” goes up and both the total
ownership concentration and the blockholder’s share increase correspondingly. If we think that,
19
once informed, the blockholder essentially becomes an insider, we can notice that this result
parallels the one, derived in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), who argue that lower quality of
legal protection requires higher insider ownership to credibly abstain from expropriation.
Proposition 1 can potentially be tested empirically. Existing studies frequently ﬁnd a nega-
tive link between law and total ownership concentration, which is consistent with our Proposition
2. However, it is very diﬃcult to obtain good evidence on the eﬀect of legal protection on out-
side ownership concentration. The problem is that empirically it is hard to distinguish between
real outsiders, who reduce managerial opportunism through monitoring, and those blockholders
that actively participate in extracting private beneﬁts themselves. Trying to disentangle these
two types of blockholders and performing an empirical analysis are the goals for future research.
Our model is closely related to two recent papers that looked at the same problem but pro-
vided diﬀerent results: Burkart and Panunzi (2006) and Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003).
Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) propose a model that delivers a negative relationship be-
tween the quality of the law and outside ownership concentration in professionally managed
companies. Burkart and Panunzi (2006), however, show that a positive relationship can be pos-
sible as well, depending on the character of interdependence between the law and monitoring.
Like us, these papers incorporate both the eﬀect of blockholder monitoring and the eﬀect of
collusion between the blockholder and the manager. The principal proposition in Burkart and
Panunzi (2006) states the following: when legal protection and monitoring are either comple-
ments or independent for the blockholder, the optimal outside ownership concentration decreases
when the law improves, while when they are substitutes, the eﬀect of the law is ambiguous.12 The
result in Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) that concerns professionally managed companies
is a direct consequence of the proposition: legal protection and monitoring are independent
for the blockholder in that paper, and, therefore, outside ownership concentration decreases
with the quality of the law.13 Introducing exogenously the possibility of collusion between the
manager and the blockholder does not qualitatively change the predictions of their models. In
our model the law and monitoring are independent for the blockholder, which is clear from the
form of the blockholder’s net utility Sb − c = p(c)αbΠ− c. This expression does not depend on
B, hence its cross derivative with respect to B and c is zero. However, in contrast to Burkart,
Panunzi and Shleifer (2003), we obtain a U-shape dependence.
There are important diﬀerences in the setups between our paper and theirs that drive the
diﬀerence in the results. We do not intend to say that one setup better ﬁts the real world than
the other one. Rather we think that their models and ours analyze diﬀerent types of companies.
The setups of Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) and Burkart and Panunzi (2006), in our
view, better ﬁt large, initially close ﬁrms, in no need for new investment, the owners of which
want to hire a professional manager in order to raise the performance. Indeed, in their models the
12See Proposition 3 in Burkart and Panunzi (2006). We have slightly rephrased it for the sake of comparison
between our model and theirs.
13 In Burkart and Panunzi (2006) the authors provide an example where legal protection and monitoring are
substitutes for the blockholder, and the outside ownership concentration is a hump-shape function of the law.
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initial owner sells a fraction of equity to dispersed shareholders and hires a professional manager
with the purpose to maximize her own wealth subject to either the manager’s participation
constraint (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003)) or the initiative constraint (Burkart and
Panunzi (2006)).14 The initial owner then stays as an outside blockholder who monitors the
manager. It is the interaction between the law, monitoring and these constraints that drives
the eﬀect of legal protection on the outside ownership concentration.
Both stronger legal protection and more monitoring make these constraints less likely to hold,
i.e. they reduce either the willingness to accept the job or the managerial initiative. Therefore,
better law requires less monitoring. Thus, the law and monitoring are ex-ante substitutes for the
initial owner. At the same time, better law can induce either less or more monitoring for a given
monitor’s share, depending on whether better law makes monitoring less or more attractive for
the monitor. Hence, the proposition in Burkart and Panunzi (2006), cited above, follows. When
better legal protection makes monitoring more attractive for the monitor (or at least does not
reduce the monitoring incentive), an improvement in the law must be compensated by a proper
decrease in the monitor’s share in order to preserve the managerial initiative (participation):
Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) illustrates such eﬀect. When better legal protection makes
monitoring less attractive for the monitor, the eﬀect of the law is ambiguous and depends on
how strongly legal protection reduces the monitoring incentive. If this eﬀect is large enough,
the block size has to be raised in order to restore eﬃcient monitoring. Otherwise, it has to be
reduced to preserve managerial initiative (participation).
Our analysis, on the contrary, better ﬁts initially manager owned companies, in which
there is no question of hiring a new manager, but which seek external ﬁnance to realize their
investment opportunities, for example, entrepreneurial ﬁrms or ﬁrms going public. In our model
the initial owner is the manager. For him the law and monitoring are ex-ante complements when
collusion is not a danger (i.e. under strong legal protection). It is easy to see by diﬀerentiating
V (αb) from subsection 3.1 with respect to c and B and remembering that an increase in B
corresponds to a decrease in the quality of legal protection: ∂V/∂c∂B = −p′(c) < 0. This is in
contrasts to the two discussed papers, in which the law and monitoring were ex-ante substitutes
for the initial owner. Therefore, in our model, eﬃciency requires that an improvement in the
law be complemented with an increase in monitoring. Since better law alone does not change
the blockholder’s monitoring incentive, her share has to be raised to induce more monitoring.
Thus, due to the diﬀerent character of interdependence between the law and monitoring for the
initial owner, our result is opposite to the one in Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003), despite
the fact that the law has no eﬀect on the willingness to monitor in both our and their paper.
If we turn to the role of collusion, it plays very diﬀerent role in our paper and the discussed
two papers. The results in Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) and Burkart and Panunzi
(2006) are robust to the introduction of the possibility of collusion. Due to the fact that ex-post
14His wealth consists of the proceeds from selling dispersed equity and his own security and private beneﬁts
(he gets the latter if he colludes with the manager).
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the private beneﬁt extraction does not involve a cost, no ownership concentration can make the
manager-blockholder coalition abstain from collusion. Thus, collusion avoidance consideration
is absent from their papers.15 In our paper, however, such consideration plays a very important
role and collusion completely reverses the eﬀect of law when legal protection becomes bad
enough (the above reasoning about interdependence of law and monitoring plays no role in the
collusion zone).
To sum up, the diﬀerence in the setups between our paper and the two discussed papers
translates into the diﬀerent character of ex-ante interdependence between the law and monitoring
for the initial owner and in the diﬀerent role of collusion. As a result, the eﬀects of legal
protection on the optimal ownership structure diﬀer.
At the same time, the fact that both our paper and Burkart and Panunzi (2006), despite
diﬀerent setups, obtain that the blockholder’s share does not have to decrease with the quality
of the law reinforces both papers’ claim that outside ownership concentration is not necessarily
a substitute for legal protection.
One lesson we can learn from the above comparison is that one should look on the character
of interdependence between the law and monitoring not only for the monitor (as in Burkart and
Panunzi (2006)), but also for the initial owner (from the ex-ante point of view), because future
monitoring decisions, as well as the quality of the law, aﬀect her/his ex-ante welfare. If we leave
aside the issue of collusion, there is a natural way to generalize the proposition in Burkart and
Panunzi (2006), taking into account both the character of ex-post interdependence between the
law and monitoring for the outside blockholder, and the character of ex-ante interdependence
for the initial owner. In the Appendix, part A3, we propose such generalization for the case
when the initial owner’s and the monitor’s welfare functions are diﬀerentiable with respect to
the law and monitoring.
6 Conclusion
The main point of this paper was to show that outside ownership concentration can be both a
substitute and a complement for legal protection of shareholders. Under very good legal pro-
tection an outside blockholder is not needed at all. However, we have focused on the situations
when legal protection is not so good and blockholder monitoring is crucial to ensure ﬁrm ﬁ-
nancing. We looked at the link between the law and the ownership structure in a detailed way,
treating diﬀerently the ﬁrm’s insider (the manager) and the outside blockholder. Legal pro-
tection aﬀects both the incentives of the manager-blockholder coalition to expropriate outside
shareholders and the monitoring incentives of the blockholder.
Under relatively good legal protection collusion between the manager and the blockholder
is not a concern as even small ownership concentration is suﬃcient to align the interests of
15At the end of Burkart and Panunzi (2006) the authors just brieﬂy discuss what can happen if private beneﬁt
extraction is ineﬃcient and thus higher ownership concentration reduces the incentive to expropriate dispersed
shareholders.
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the coalition and the dispersed shareholders. The optimal block size is the one that ensures
the optimal balance between costly monitoring and ineﬃcient expropriation. A decrease in
the quality of shareholder protection makes expropriation easier, i.e. less costly and, therefore,
more eﬃcient ex-post. Hence, monitoring has to be decreased in the optimum and so does the
blockholder’s share.
Once the quality of the law falls below certain threshold, collusion becomes too attractive.
As a consequence, the blockholder has to be given a very large share and the optimal monitoring
has to be sacriﬁced for the commitment to abstain from collusion. As the law worsens further,
collusion becomes more attractive and the outside block size needs to be increased in order to
credibly preserve the “no collusion” incentive.
Overall, the link between the outside ownership concentration and legal protection has a
U-shape. We should also note that the total ownership concentration (its lower bound, strictly
speaking), deﬁned as the joint share of the manager and the blockholder, decreases as the law
improves independently of the quality of the law. Thus, our model does not contradict the
empirically observed relationship between the law and the ownership concentration. At the
same time, more empirical work is needed to verify our prediction about the link between the
law and outside ownership concentration.
We acknowledge that the speciﬁc form of relationship we have found does not have to be
general for all types of companies. In particular, works by Burkart and Panunzi (2006) and
Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) show that other patterns can be possible. We think
that our model is rather suitable for entrepreneurial ﬁrms that search ﬁnance for investing in
new projects and go public for this purpose, while their models are mostly applicable to large,
initially closely held ﬁrms that seek to increase performance by hiring a professional manager.
We have also suggested some generalization of our analysis and that of Burkart and Panunzi
(2006). Though it is done at an abstract level, we hope that it adds some value in understanding
how the eﬀects of a legal system on the ownership structure may depend on a particular real
world setting.
APPENDIX
A1. Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that the manager chooses (αd, αb) such that (CP) does
not hold. Then collusion will occur at t = 2. Consequently, the dispersed shareholders will
provide no ﬁnance at t = 0 and all the ﬁnance can come only from the blockholder. The
manager will obviously go for private beneﬁt extraction. The surplus of the colluding parties is
Σ ≡ B(1−m)− (1− αd)Π > 0. If the blockholder becomes informed, her stake in collusion is
Sbc = αbΠ+ (1− µ)Σ, the manager’s stake in collusion is Mc = αmΠ+ µΣ = B(1−m)− Sbc,
where subscript c stands for “collusion” and parameter µ reﬂects the bargaining power of the
manager.
The blockholder’s monitoring eﬀort is then: cc = argmax
c
p(c)(αbΠ + (1 − µ)Σ) − c and
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satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition:
p′(cc) =
1
αbΠ+ (1− µ)Σ
(Mc)
We are going to show now that the manager can make himself better oﬀ by selling no equity
to dispersed shareholders (αd = 0), which ensures the absence of collusion, and picking the
blockholder’s share such that her monitoring eﬀort under no prospect of collusion equals cc and
her welfare is unchanged.
To ensure that under no prospect of collusion the blockholder’s monitoring eﬀort is cc the
manager should set her share α̂b such that α̂bΠ = αbΠ + (1 − µ)Σ ≡ Sbc, i.e. α̂b =
Sbc
Π
.
Since Sbc < Π, share α̂b is below 1, i.e. it exists. The manager’s share is α̂m ≡ 1 − α̂b. The
blockholder’s welfare is obviously unchanged since he is still the only one who provides funds.
The manager is better oﬀ because the probability that the blockholder is informed has not
changed and, in the event when the blockholder is informed, he gets (1 − α̂b)Π ≡ Π − Sbc
instead of B − Sbc as before.
Hence, we have proved that the manager will always prefer to choose the ownership structure
that ensures the absence of collusion at t = 2.
A2. Proof of Lemma 2. 1. Let us prove that (P) is downward sloping. It is easy to see if we
rewrite it as [p(c∗(αb))αbΠ− c
∗(αb)]+αdp(c
∗(αb))Π− I = 0. The term in square brackets is the
blockholder’s utility when she optimally chooses her monitoring eﬀort. This term is obviously
increasing in αb, since the blockholder gets more from an increase in her share even if she does
not optimally adjust her monitoring eﬀort. The function p(c∗(αb)) is increasing in αb as well
since c∗(·) and p(·) are increasing functions. Therefore, if we want to keep (P) binding an
increase in αb must be compensated by an appropriate decrease in αd.
2. Just looking at (P) it is straightforward to see that αd =∞ when αb = 0.
3. First, let us show that (P) either intersects the line αb + αd = 1 twice, is tangent to it,
or does not intersect it at all. It can be seen from the following reasoning. When αb + αd = 1
(P) becomes:
Πp(c∗(αb))− I = c
∗(αb)
In terms of c, the left-hand side is a concave function of c, equal to −I at c = 0 and having an
inﬁnite ﬁrst derivative at c = 0, while the right-hand side is a 45◦ line. The left-hand side can
either intersect the 45◦ line twice, be tangent to it, or not intersect it at all. Since c∗(αb) is a
strictly increasing and continuous function we get the result, stated few lines above.
Furthermore, Assumption 3 says:
Πp(c∗(1))− c∗(1)− I > 0
It means that point (0, 1) lies above (P), that is (P) passes below (0, 1). Since αb = 0 when
αd =∞, and (P) is a continuous function, then (P) intersects αb+αd = 1. Furthermore, since,
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as we have just shown, (P) can intersect αb+αd = 1 at most twice, there is only one intersection
point for non-negative values of αd and αb.
A3. Interdependence between the law and monitoring and the eﬀect of the law
on the outside blockholder’s share.
Assume that the welfare of the initial owner from the ex-ante perspective, V (λ, c), depends
only on some parameter λ of legal protection of shareholders and intensity c of future monitoring
of the manager by the outside blockholder. Assume that the blockholder’s welfare, S(β, λ, c),
depends only on λ, c and her share β.
We deﬁne the initial owner as the one who chooses the ownership structure of the company
at the initial moment. We do not specify precisely who the initial owner and the blockholder
are. The initial owner can be the manager, as in our paper, or the founder of the company who
sells it (partly or completely) and steps out from the management, as in Burkart, Panunzi and
Shleifer (2003). The outside blockholder can be a completely new large shareholder, as in our
model, or the same person as the initial owner if she steps out from the management.
Assume that V (λ, c) and S(β, λ, c) are everywhere diﬀerentiable with respect to all argu-
ments, and Vcc, Scc, Vcλ, Scλ and Sλβ exist everywhere as well. Assume also that both functions
are concave and have interior maximum. Let us denote by c(λ) ≡ argmax
c
V (λ, c) the optimal
monitoring intensity for the initial owner for given λ, and by c∗(β, λ) ≡ argmax
c
S(β, λ, c) the
blockholder’s choice of monitoring given β andλ.
Assumption: For any λ the blockholder’s marginal return to monitoring increases (weakly)
with her share, i.e. ∂S(β, λ, c)/∂β∂c ≥ 0, at any β and c.
This assumption implies that c∗β(β, λ) ≥ 0, i.e. the blockholder’s choice of monitoring
increases (weakly) with the blockholder’s share.
The optimal blockholder’s share β(λ) for given λ is the one that equalizes the blockholder’s
choice of monitoring with the optimal monitoring: c(λ) = c∗(β(λ), λ). We assume that for any
λ such β(λ) exists.
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Deﬁnition:
Legal protection and monitoring are complements (substitutes) for the blockholder for some
β if ∂S(β, λ, c)/∂c∂λ > 0 (∂S(β, λ, c)/∂c∂λ < 0).
Legal protection and monitoring are complements (substitutes) for the initial owner if ∂V (λ, c)/∂c∂λ >
0 (∂V (λ, c)/∂c∂λ < 0).
Proposition 3
If Scλ(β, λ, c)/ |Scc(β, λ, c)| > Vcλ(λ, c)/ |Vcc(β, λ, c)| at β = β, c = c then dβ/dλ < 0, i.e.
the optimal block decreases with the quality of the law,
If Scλ(β, λ, c)/ |Scc(β, λ, c)| < Vcλ(λ, c)/ |Vcc(β, λ, c)| at β = β, c = c then dβ/dλ > 0, i.e.
the optimal block increases with the quality of the law.
Proof. As λ goes up both c∗(β, λ) and c(λ) move. If for given β a marginal increase (decrease)
in c∗(β, λ) is larger (smaller) than a marginal increase (decrease) in c(λ) then β has to be
reduced in order to equalize c∗(β, λ) and c(λ) again, and vice versa. Formally:
if ∂c∗(β, λ)/∂λ > dc(λ)/dλ then dβ/dλ < 0
if ∂c∗(β, λ)/∂λ < dc(λ)/dλ then dβ/dλ > 0
Using the implicit function theorem, this result can be restated as:
if − Scλ(β, λ, c)/Scc(β, λ, c) > −Vcλ(λ, c)/Vcc(β, λ, c) at β = β, c = c
then dβ/dλ < 0
if − Scλ(β, λ, c)/Scc(β, λ, c) < −Vcλ(λ, c)/Vcc(β, λ, c) at β = β, c = c
then dβ/dλ > 0
Taking into account that Scc(β, λ, c) < 0, Vcc(β, λ, c) < 0 we obtain the result.
It can be interpreted in the following way: when the law and monitoring are suﬃciently
more complementary for the blockholder than for the initial owner the optimal blockholder’s
share decreases with the quality of the law, and when the law and monitoring are suﬃciently less
complementary for the blockholder than for the initial owner the optimal blockholder’s share is
increases with the quality of the law.
In our model, in the zone where collusion is not a danger, Scλ(β, λ, c) = 0 and Vcλ(λ, c) > 0
and, hence, the optimal outside block increases as the law improves. In Burkart and Pa-
nunzi (2006) Vcλ(λ, c) < 0.
16 Hence, if Scλ(β, λ, c) ≥ 0 the optimal outside block decreases
with the quality of the law, like in Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003). If Scλ(β, λ, c) < 0
the result is ambiguous and depends on relative magnitudes of Scλ(β, λ, c)/ |Scc(β, λ, c)| and
16To be rigorous, in the original paper Burkart and Panunzi (2006) the initial owner’s welfare is not everywhere
diﬀerentiable in c given λ and vise versa due to the assumption of discrete managerial eﬀort. For our analysis
to be applicable to their model it has to be modiﬁed in such a way that the eﬀort aﬀects the ﬁrm value in a
continuous manner (like e.g. in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997)).
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Vcλ(λ, c)/ |Vcc(β, λ, c)|. This is what Proposition 3 of Burkart and Panunzi (2006) essentially
says.
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